Brexit: A risk assessment for language provision in Manchester

Amelia Abercrombie

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List of Acronyms

CFREU – Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union
DWP – Department for Work and Pensions
EEA – European Economic Area
EFTA – European Free Trade Association
ERA – European Research Agency
ERDF – European Regional Investment Fund
ESF – European Social Fund
ESIF – European Structural Investment Fund
GM LEP – Greater Manchester Local Enterprise Partnership
GMCA – Greater Manchester Combined Authority
GMCVO – Greater Manchester Centre for Voluntary Organisation
LEP – Local Enterprise Partnership
NALDIC - the National Association for Language Development In the Curriculum
SFA – Skills Funding Agency
TEU – Treaty on European Union
TFEU – Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union
UNCRPD – United Nations Convention on Rights of Persons with Disabilities
WEA – Workers’ Educational Association
Summary

The risk to language provisions in Manchester relates to several levels of uncertainty. In the short term, there is uncertainty surrounding the withdrawal negotiations. In the medium term, there is uncertainty regarding areas directly funded by the EU. In the long term, it is uncertain what effect restrictions on movement, loss of skills and research funding, and loss of social funding will have on the UK economy and society.

Certain language provisions will be at direct risk with the withdrawal of EU legislation and funding. These could theoretically be replaced by the UK government with funds that would otherwise have gone to the EU. However, given the austerity measures of the UK government, and the shift to the right in public discourses, it is unlikely that many of them will be replaced at a central level. Equally, it is difficult to measure the possible change in demand for certain language provisions caused by shifts in migratory patterns and socio-economic provisions.

The risk to MFL, ESOL, community languages, and translation and interpreting services could lead to a change in linguistic repertoires in the UK. This would, first, potentially be damaging for a range of industries that work internationally. Secondly, it could lead to the loss of intercultural dialogue within the UK, and increased segregation. Thirdly, it could prevent certain groups, in particular the intersectionally disadvantaged (such as poor migrant women), from accessing essential services.

Changes in the rules which regulate the movement of people, and the possibilities of finding work, are likely to lead to demographic shifts. While it is hard to predict how this will occur, it is relatively certain that leaving the EU will see the numbers of some migrant groups diminishing, while others may increase, resulting in changing needs for language provisions. This could potentially be extremely problematic if it is coupled with increased precarity and segregation.

While the loss of these services and the changes in needs for these services are by no means inevitable, when taken within the context of ongoing austerity measures, and a shift in the boundaries of publicly acceptable discourse with regards to race and ethnicity, it is unlikely they will be replaced in a sufficient manner, let alone improved. Austerity measures in the UK have consistently hit the most vulnerable groups, those who are likely to be hit harder by the removal of EU funds. At the same time, political discourses have taken advantage of growing discontent to scapegoat migrants and other ethnic and religious minorities. This trend seems unlikely to be stemmed in the wake of Brexit.
In addition to these three problems themselves, there may also be a loss of UK based research into the causes and consequences of these problems due to reduction in funds and restrictions on researchers. Lack of understanding of such societal problems would lead to their being compounded.
Purpose of report

The aim of this report is to assess the potential risk of Brexit for language provisions in Manchester, and suggest possible ways to mitigate this risk.

The central question of this report is: what is the effect of Brexit on language provision in Manchester? This question is broken down into the following four sub-questions:

1. What is the risk to language diversity?
2. What is the risk to multicultural communication?
3. What is the risk to language skills?
4. What is the risk to global outreach and research?

Answering these questions requires, first, a background discussion on the way the relationship between the UK and the EU affects language provision, in particular legislation on free movement and employment, and EU funding to the UK. This information was gathered primarily from EU and UK governmental websites, as well as non-governmental organisation websites, and other media outlets. This is followed by a discussion on the shift in public and political discourses on migration and migrants, paying particular attention to the discourse around the Manchester Mayoral elections in May 2017. The sources for this information are local media and local government/administration sites, advocacy sites, along with some theoretical article which are used to frame these debates.

The main part of this report also relies on a range of sources. In assessing the risk involved in the loss if EU legislation, and of EU funding, this report uses EU and UK governmental sources. Census data and analysis is also used to look at migration patterns and movement. In addition, a range of non-governmental groups websites and publications are used. Media reporting on relevant issues is also included, in particular with regards to hate crime, and to public discourses. Where appropriate academic research on language and multilingualism is also used.
1 Background

1.1 The UK and the EU
The European Union consists of a wide and complex range of bodies and funds. Prior to the UK triggering Article 50 on April 29, Article 50 had never been triggered before making it unclear what options the UK will have post-Brexit. Some details will become clearer after the UK government’s negotiations with the EU, which began on June 19, while others will take longer. The government has produced a white paper which sets out the themes of the government’s goals in negotiations with the EU, but these remain both vague and speculative. It does mention controlling immigration, and given the UK aims to restrict the freedom of movement and the right to work of EU citizens it is unlikely the UK will have many options open with regards to other benefits of the EU.

During the referendum campaign it was suggested that the UK could leave the EU while remaining part of certain desirable programmes and agreements, on the model of Switzerland and Norway. At present, Switzerland and Norway have far higher levels of EU immigration than the UK as a proportion of their populations.\(^1\) Switzerland currently holds a bilateral Free Movement of Persons Agreement with the EU, and Norway, as a member of the EEA (European Economic Area) must apply the same free movement rules as EU member states, but has no vote on the rules (Open Europe 2014). Unlike the UK, both Switzerland and Norway are part of Schengen, the open border area of Europe. Given the centrality of restricting free movement, and strengthening borders to supporters of Brexit it seems unlikely that the UK would in fact follow this model.

The terms of leaving the EU, and the possible effects of these terms remain highly unpredictable. They are likely to affect community groups and minority culture, and therefore language provisions first, by changing restrictions on work and movement, and secondly by withdrawing certain specific types of funds. The rhetoric surrounding the referendum itself also indicates a significant shift in ideas of Britishness and multiculturalism in the UK.

\(^{1}\) Open Europe (2014) state that for 2012, gross EU immigration to Switzerland amounted to a gross inflow of 11.33 EU migrants per 1,000 of Swiss population. Gross EU migration to the UK was higher in absolute terms but proportionally had a rate of 2.48 EU migrants per 1,000 of its population. Norway, a member of the European Economic Area, also had a rate of gross EU immigration far higher than the UK, with 7.38 EU migrants per 1,000 of its population.
Movement & Employment

We are likely to see significant changes in demographics and migration patterns in the wake of Brexit. Shifts in migration patterns may affect the type and number of languages spoken in the UK, and thus impact on the needs for language provisions. There are three main EU policy areas relevant to internal migration in the EU. The first, Article 34 of the CFREU (Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union) OJ 2002/c 326/02, protects fundamental rights. The second, 2004/38/EC, Article 7, determines the right of residence. The third, TFEU (Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union) Article 21 OJ 2012/c 326/01, determines European citizenship. There is no certainty about what will happen within these policy areas following negotiations. Commons Briefing papers CBP-7213 argues that very few EEA workers in the UK could meet the requirements placed on non-EEA workers, and warns of the possibility of a labour shortage if freedom of movement is curtailed. Similarly, the European Directive on the recognition of qualifications may affect labour and language provisions. In particular, health and social care professionals could see foreign qualifications not recognised in the UK, and they may require further English language checks. This would slow down or prevent the immigration of health workers to the UK, a sector which relies heavily on migrant workers (see Miller 2016).

If restrictions are placed on EU workers there is likely to be a variety of knock on effects (Carmel 2016). Certain low-skilled types of work employ a high percentage of EU migrant workers, including packing (42%) and food and drink (40%) (Alan 2017). Similarly, low skilled employment in food packing factories may be disproportionately affected if customs regimes are introduced. If low skilled and precarious labour from Eastern Europe is no longer available it will need to be replaced either through a severe reduction in working conditions for UK citizens, or agreed work visas for cheap labour from either inside or outside the EU. This latter option may be problematic politically as it would not reduce immigration. Additionally agriculture, another area that commonly employs this type of labour, is likely to be the area heavily affected by Brexit due to the withdrawal of subsidies and, in some areas the regional development fund.

During the referendum campaign it was suggested that the UK have a points based visa system, based on the Australian model, whereby people would be given work visas to come to the UK if they had skills that were in deficit. This may mean an increase in some types of migration. Alternatively, higher skilled workers may still choose not to come to the UK for a variety of reasons including the lack of a stable future, lack of spousal or family visas, economic uncertainty, and for certain types of work, lack of EU investment. In addition, visible ethnic and religious minorities may wish to avoid the negative political climate in the UK. Regarding high-skilled workers, there is specific concern among academic institutions about the loss of staff, as
a high proportion of academic staff and researchers are not UK nationals, and the loss of resources coming from the EU, which could severely affect the UK’s reputation and ability to attract leading academics (Institute for Government 2017).

In short, certain employment related pull factors which bring migrants of various backgrounds (both EU and non-EU) to the UK may be significantly reduced. On the other hand withdrawal from the Dublin agreement, whereby non-EU asylum seekers can be returned to their first point of entry (in many cases Greece or Italy), coupled with increased global instability, could mean an increase in the number of asylum seekers. It is unlikely the UK will be allowed to remain part of this agreement in the negotiations with the EU (Mayblin 2016). There is also the possibility of a change in the 2003 Le Touquet treaty which allows for British immigration checks at Calais, though this is a bilateral agreement so it would not be automatically affected by Brexit.

The position of refugees, asylum seekers and other migrants already in the UK may also change. There are a variety of EU funds which support access to basic services and support integration for this group. The UK has received approximately £240 million from current EU migration funding streams. This has included funding for Assisted Voluntary Returns schemes, which facilitate irregular migrants’ departure from the UK, as well as projects to support refugee resettlement and community integration in the UK (Justice and Peace 2016). At present the NGO Migrant Help (Migrant Help: www.migranthelpuk.org) receives funding from the EU Asylum Migration and Integration Fund, which is allocated via the Home Office. Assuming that many asylum seekers, in contrast to other migrant groups, do not have the choice of going elsewhere, the likely effect of the withdrawal of these funds would be increased exclusion, segregation and marginalisation of extremely vulnerable groups of people.

EU funding

The UK benefits from a variety of different sources of EU funds. The largest source (63%) of funds from the EU is for agriculture, followed by Growth & Jobs (23%), regional policy (10%), Citizenship, Freedom, Security and Justice (2%), and administration (2%) (Gov.uk 2017a). A central source of EU funding is the ESIF (European Structural Investment Fund), which is the aligned programme of the ERDF (European Regional Development Fund) and the ESF (European Social Fund). The aim of much EU funding is to promote the ideals of the European Union, and to reduce disparities of wealth between countries and regions. The ERDF (European

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2 For the UK government’s details of EU funding see Gov.uk (2017a). For details on EU funding for NGOs see Europa (2016a). For EU country information on the UK and the budget see Europa (2017a). For an explanation of different EU funding sources see the website European Funding (2017a).
Regional Development Fund) offers funding to areas which are economically disadvantaged, and the ESF offers fund to groups of people who are economically disadvantaged, isolated, or marginalised. This effectively means that the most socio-economically deprived areas and groups in the UK are most at risk of losing support after withdrawal from the EU (see Milne 2016; BBC 2016; Dunford 2016; Henley 2016; Postles 2016).

As the UK is a net contributor to the EU budget it is feasible that the UK government could replace these funding streams from the national budget. However, given ongoing privatisation and austerity measures put in place by successive governments it seems likely that the British government would replace only certain forms of funding, taking the opportunity to make further spending reductions. At present the government has promised to underwrite any funding which is withdrawn before the projects run their course but no clear statement has been made about the period that follows. In turn, the effect of this uncertainty on investment and possible restrictions on trade is likely to lead to significant economic changes which will affect both requirements for and provision of funding.

In the UK ESF funds are optionally match funded by the DWP (Department for Work and Pensions), the SFA (Skills Funding Agency) and The Big Lottery. ESIF funds are administered by the LEP (Local Enterprise Partnership). The Greater Manchester LEP have a range of partner organisations and have four priority areas.

1. Priority 1 has two aims: Promoting research and innovation, and inclusive labour markets. In the Greater Manchester LEP area this includes a project with the Big Lottery Fund called ‘Building Better Opportunities’ of £10,000,000 (50% European funds), a project with the SFA called ‘GM LEP Priority Area 1 Application’ for £78,888,889 (50% European funds), and three scientific and environmental research projects which will not be detailed here.

2. Priority 2 is ‘Skills for Growth’. In the Greater Manchester LEP area the only project for this priority is ‘GM LEP Priority 2 Application’. The recipient of funds is the SFA, and the project total is £21,801,666, 50% of which comes from the ESIF. This fund supports lifelong learning, and other skills aimed at employment.

3. Priority 3 is ‘Enhancing competitiveness’ which includes a variety of projects aimed at supporting SMEs (Small & Medium-sized Enterprises).

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3 For a description of the aims and purpose of ESF in the United Kingdom see (Europa 2017d).
4 For details on the relationship between the DWP and ESF see Gov.uk (2017b).
5 For details on the Big Lottery co-funding with ESF see Big Lottery Fund UK (2017a).
6 For details on the effect of the loss of ESF on local authorities see (Vilanova 2016); See also Gov.uk. (2017c).
4. Priority 4 is ‘Supporting the shift towards a low carbon economy in all sectors’ which includes one large environmental project, and a smaller project to support energy efficient growth for SMEs.

In the past, this fund has supported various organisations relevant to this report such as the WEA (Workers’ Educational Association) (WEA 2017) and the GMCVO (Greater Manchester Centre for Voluntary Organisation) (GMCVO 2017) who then administer community grants. These grants have the overall aim of supporting social inclusion, and emphasise the importance of providing access to training and education for disadvantaged groups.7

The GMCVO states that ‘158 groups in the region have already received £2 million of ESF funding over four previous grant rounds in 2012-13’ (GMCVO 2017a). GM Futures, a partnership of a variety of organisations working in skills and employment seek ‘utilise ESF 2014-20 funding opportunities to develop a more coherent and effective employment and skills system in Greater Manchester’ (GM Futures 2015). Following the referendum there was a pause in calls for ESF projects, which then restarted in October 2016. Most current calls will last for around three years - to mid 2020’ (GMCVO 2017b). It is expected there will be further ESF calls for GM - in particular now that GM is the first non-national body to have achieved ESF Co-Finance status (GMCVO 2017b). These funds will support the Greater Manchester Strategy, aimed at providing inclusion and employment for disadvantaged groups, including ethnic minorities and migrants.

Arts and culture funding (such as Creative Europe), educational exchange programmes (Erasmus), and research funding (such as Horizon 2020) are at further risk as these programmes do not benefit solely from European funds, but also from European cooperation. If the UK does not remain part of these programmes, it is possible that the UK will replace funding in these areas. However, as these areas benefit from trans-European dialogue and the freedom of movement of people and ideas, simply replacing funding at a national level would not be able to replace the benefits of these programmes.9

7 For details related specifically to the north west see Gov.uk. (2017d); For details of the programme in Greater Manchester see Big Lottery Fund UK (2017b); For details of earlier ESF grants in Manchester see McAlister (2011). See also Government Funding (2017).
8 Greater Manchester Centre for Voluntary Organisation; Greater Manchester Chamber of Commerce; Greater Manchester Colleges Group; Greater Manchester Learning Provider Network; The Manchester College; The Manchester Growth Company.
9 For information on the general effects of and uncertainty surrounding Brexit with regards to EU grants see Brexit Funding (2017). For a discussion of the effects of Brexit in the UK across policy areas see Commons Briefing papers CBP-7213 (Miller 2016). For a discussion of the economic impact of EU membership on the UK prior to the referendum see Commons Briefing papers SN06730 (Thompson 2013).
Prior to the election of Andy Burnham as Mayor of Manchester in May 2017, the interim mayor, Tony Lloyd, expressed concern over the lack of any discussion of Brexit between central government and authorities in the North (GMCA 2017). There is also concern regarding the economic effect of Brexit on the North, and the potential problems of loss of EU funds (The GM Brexit Monitor, August 2016). The GM Brexit Monitor notes that GM receives funding from the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) and European Social Fund (ESF) as well as from Transnational Funds. In addition, there is uncertainty regarding the future of European-UK funded research partnerships, which will affect Manchester as a University city. On EU transnational funding, AGMA (Association of Greater Manchester Authorities) has secured a number of European bids since November 2016: Oldham (three Interreg Europe bids), TfGM (two Horizon 2020 bids) and Manchester (one Horizon 2020 bid). Since Horizon 2020 was launched in 2013 Greater Manchester universities have been involved in 144 projects (€77m of grant funding). New Economy, an organisation which delivers policy, strategy and research advice to promote economic growth and prosperity in Greater Manchester, is focused on maximising the impact of European funding to support the Greater Manchester Strategy, this includes the most effective use of ERDF and ESF and non-structural funds, as well as driving the European strategy agenda to support Greater Manchester’s growth ambitions. Within the city of Manchester, the Manchester City Council Economic Scrutiny Council (ESC) report (Nov. 2016) is concerned about the risks of a negative impact on investment, the longer term impact on higher education due to a lack of highly skilled workers, the risk of higher unemployment coupled with lower wages, and the exacerbation of the current housing crisis. As such Manchester faces both general (UK wide) and specific risks as a result of withdrawal. In the context of these potential losses, devolution can be treated as an opportunity to replace and restructure areas previously funded by the EU. Devolution in Manchester therefore provides an opportunity to reduce some of the negative effects of these changes, and cater for and take advantage of diversity in the area.

1.2 Devomanc and the discourse on migration

Within this broad context of exit from EU legislation and funding, Manchester has a unique opportunity to decide its own future. DevoManc refers to the devolution of certain powers from central government to the Greater Manchester region. The region is made up of ten councils, 

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10 Further information regarding the possible effects of Brexit in Manchester are available in a regular newsletter run by The New Economy (See Greater Manchester Brexit monitor, New Economy 2017). Details of EU funding to the North West which will continue until withdrawal can be found in the report by Network for Europe (2016). For details on devolution and the voluntary sector see Hannan (2016).

11 This and other reports are available at the Manchester City Council website (2017).
and is run by a mayor (Andy Burnham) elected in May 2017. The aim of the devolution process is to promote regional cooperation within Greater Manchester, and to give the region more control over local issues. This control will of course be limited by the allocation of funds from central government. The governing body of the region is the GMCA (Greater Manchester Combined Authority). The New Economy deliver policy strategy and research for GMCA and GM LEP (Greater Manchester Local Enterprise Partnership).

In the run-up to the referendum the Remain campaign focused on issues of the economy, while the Leave campaign focused heavily on the issue of immigration. Both campaigns were marred by inaccuracies and misrepresentations. In the aftermath of the referendum, immigration and diversity have become one of the central issues up for discussion in the run-up to the mayoral election. Upon selection as the Labour mayoral candidate Andy Burnham announced that he was not part of the 'Westminster bubble', and that he had consistently spoken about the failure to respond to 'legitimate concerns on immigration' (quoted in the Guardian, Perraudin 2016). The idea of 'legitimate concerns about migration' has been voiced by a range of figures, including the late Jo Cox (Cox 2016), and The Archbishop of Canterbury (BBC NEWS 2016b). This speaks to two pertinent issues raised by the referendum campaign and in its aftermath. First, the importance of class, and second, the contestation of the idea of Britishness. The feeling of dislocation from Westminster and the political class is felt by many, particularly in 'left behind' and 'white working class' areas. These areas tend to be post-industrial, formerly represented by Labour but now with high rates of voter apathy (Goodwin & Heath 2016). Referring to the 'Westminster bubble', is an attempt to tap into the anti-elitism of the Leave campaign. The anti-elitist discourse of the Leave campaign meant that the referendum was used to voice discontent with the political elite as a whole.

Elsewhere, in an interview with the Meteor (a local Manchester alternative news site), Burnham argued that Labour’s failure to tackle ‘concerns over jobs, wages, housing and schools linked to migration had contributed to the loss of the referendum’ (The Meteor 2017). This reiterates a distinction between, on the one hand xenophobia, and on the other concerns about ‘pressure’ on jobs, wages, housing and primary schools (Burnham 2016; see also Asthana 2016). This separates the concern over provisions and services, and concern over migration, but still implies a link. The same article also criticised the ‘class divide’ in the left, arguing that middle-class remain voters look down on Leave voters as uneducated or xenophobic (The Meteor 2017).

This ties in to the phrase ‘legitimate concerns about migration’. This phrase first suggests that people’s concerns are actually about migration, not, for example the loss of certain services, and
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the scapegoating of immigrants by politicians and the media. Secondly, it suggests that some concerns are more legitimate than others. Implicit in this statement is the idea that people who are ethnically white British, English monolingual, Christian or atheist are ‘more’ British than people who do not fit into these categories, and their voice is more legitimate. Concerns about racism, Islamophobia, and other forms of prejudice are not ‘legitimate’ in the same way, as the people who do, or would, voice such concerns are not seen as having a right to be here.

This then fits into more general debates around immigration, often related to access to services such as healthcare, social care, and welfare. The discourse surrounding welfare in the UK more generally is often extremely aggressive, and despite the extent of cuts and the increase in restrictions, many of those who receive welfare support are portrayed by politicians and the media as ‘scroungers’ or unfair recipients of support. The promotion of increasingly punitive welfare systems can be seen to create rivalries, rather than solidarities, among the most disadvantaged groups (Hoggett, Wilkinson & Beedell 2013). Receipt of benefits is increasingly based on meeting certain conditions, rather than having certain needs, which reinforces the idea that there are deserving and undeserving poor. Migrants, often portrayed as taking out of the system without paying in (despite evidence to the contrary) are then seen as the undeserving, creating a discourse of welfare chauvinism (see for example Van der Waal 2010). This in turn is metaphorically understood in terms of space: lack of resources is described with the phrase ‘the UK is full up’. This idea of lack of space then links everyday experiences of overstretched services, and much larger scale border regimes. The deserving/undeserving distinction, rather than being rejected by minority groups, is refracted with, for example many South Asians in the UK voting Leave (Abbasi 2016), positing themselves as deserving in contrast to East European newcomers, or Polish media sources applying discourses of undeserving migrants onto Romanians and/or Roma (Polish Express 2017).

Similarly, Burnham has also criticised EU free movement as a system that is used by multi-nationals to undermine wages, tweeting ‘There is nothing socialist about a system of free movement that is used by multi-nationals to undermine wages’ (6:18 PM - 7 Dec 2016; see also May 2016). This implies that the availability of cheap labour, primarily from Eastern Europe, enables businesses to lower wages and working conditions as migrant workers are willing to accept such conditions, if only for a limited period. However, rather than seeking to ensure workers’ rights (many of which are EU legislation and are therefore at risk) this perspective implies that the movement of workers itself is the problem, shifting the blame onto immigration and, indirectly, onto immigrants themselves. Placing the blame for cheap labour onto EU free movement not only exonerates employers and politicians, but also ignores the reliance of the
UK on cheap labour prior to being part of the EU, when the UK relied on, for example, migrant workers from Ireland, or from the former colonies.

This perspective on immigration and class links with broader discussions which went on both during and after the referendum campaigns. Class differences played a large role in the way the election was fought, with anti-immigration rhetoric striking a strong cord in deprived, post-industrial areas, while arguments for a stronger economy and a cosmopolitan outlook were generally more successful in wealthier urban areas. While age, ethnicity, and income were all strong indicators of a leave vote (with older, white British, poorer people voting Leave), the strongest indicator was educational and skill level (Goodwin & Heath 2016). Those with fewer skills, and therefore fewer opportunities were far more likely to vote leave. This was particularly true for areas which had experienced long term deprivation and high unemployment, areas which did not see the economic benefits of remaining. The exception to this trend were areas, such as parts of Manchester, which despite experiencing economic deprivation still had an overall remain vote. It seems that this relates to higher levels of ethnic diversity in these areas, suggesting that as well as economic deprivation and lack of opportunities spatial segregation also played a part in the way people voted. As such Manchester is in an unusual position being a remain-voting area but also with higher levels of socio-economic deprivation.

The distinction between legitimate (provision based) and illegitimate (racist) concerns about immigration also links to contention over terms such as ‘racist’. The Anti-immigration rhetoric of the Leave campaign was multi-faceted: while in some respects it was based on an objection to the race, religion and language of immigrants (or those perceived to be immigrants), it was also related to competition over scarce resources. The resentment about being termed ‘racist’ for being anti-immigration further exacerbated class based tensions particularly with regards to a perceived ‘left wing liberal elite’, a perception which groups such as UKIP play on heavily. Both in the run-up to the referendum and after, this was voiced in terms of a distinction between ‘racism’ and ‘legitimate concerns about migration’. Legitimate concerns about migration were seen as concerns about the crisis in the NHS, the increasingly conditional and punitive welfare system. These were blamed not on austerity measures, or the politicians that are in charge of these systems, but on immigration. As such, people’s frustration with the deprivation of these services, is projected onto those who are seen as the cause of this deprivation. Here the term ‘cultural fundamentalism’ (Stolcke 1995) is perhaps more useful than ‘racism’. Resentment is not simply the resentment of white people directed at non-white people. Rather there is an assumption of an essential relation between space (the UK) and culture (various bounded ideas
of ‘Britishness’). The implication is that migrants who come to Britain should assimilate into this restricted notion of Britishness, while not proving competition for scarce resources. Anti-immigration politics easily turns into anti-immigrant politics. From this perspective immigrants, the Other of cultural fundamentalism, are identified by being visibly or audibly different, which is to say people who don’t look white, people who wear middle Eastern or Muslim attire, and people who speak foreign languages or English with and accent.  

Despite claims that the Leave vote was a vote against unfair policies and not migrants themselves, and that it was not a racist vote, there was a huge rise in hate crimes after the Leave vote won. A number of these crimes were directed against EU migrants, especially Poles, identified as foreign either by their speaking a foreign language, or speaking English with an accent. There were also attacks on non-white people (regardless of citizenship or status in the UK), and on those who were visibly Muslim. TellMAMA, an organisation which seeks to report anti-Islamic crimes, finds that most attacks are committed by white men, against Muslim women, and carry misogynistic, racist and Islamophobic overtones. This is not to say that all Leave voters support violence against other ethnic, racial and religious groups, but rather that for a range of reasons, the Leave vote meant people felt empowered to make such attacks (see IRR News Team 2016). In Manchester there have been reports of attacks on Poles, a stabbing at a takeaway in Rochdale, an American racially abused on a tram, racist threats made to an Afro-Caribbean Care Group, a British Asian mother physically assaulted while taking her son to school and many more (Weaver & Laville 2016; Nelson 2016; Wilding 2016). What is clear from these incidents, and those reported in other parts of the country, is that while EU migrants from arrange of countries have been attacked, it is particularly East Europeans who have suffered, especially Poles. In addition, people who are not white and/or Muslim have been attacked, regardless of their citizenship.

The widespread nature of these attacks, and the way they have been targeted, show that the anger surrounding the Leave vote was about far more than EU freedom of movement. Rather than the EU itself the campaign focused on a limited idea of what it means to be British, and the problem of access to services to people who fall within this limited category. The way the boundaries of Britishness is drawn varies, but in general a distinction is drawn between white and non-white, Christian and Muslim, and monolingual native English speakers and speakers of

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12 Resentment is also directed towards the elites, though not for their cuts to services. Rather, there is resentment towards what is seen as unfairness; while the elite are imposing severe restrictions on EU migrants, Islamic groups, and refugees and Asylum seekers, the resentment is towards a perception that the elite call those living in deprived white working class areas ‘racist’ for objecting to this state of affairs. ‘Liberal left wing elite’ then serves as another enemy of ‘the people’.
foreign languages. The first two issues of race and religion have been discussed elsewhere. For this report the issue of English monolingualism is central. This is part of a discourse on English monolingualism and immigrant languages, which has a much longer history. One example of this is contested in a post by NALDIC (the National Association for Language Development In the Curriculum 2012) who cite a Sunday Express article 'We pay tutors to teach immigrants their own language' (Jeory 2012). The title of this article is symptomatic of a broader resentment about resources and migrant languages, which fed into the referendum debates. This title can be broken down into three main tenets. First, that learning one’s ‘own language’ is pointless, unlike learning another ‘foreign’ language. Second, there is an assumption that ‘we’ are separate from ‘immigrants’, and that ‘we’ are the taxpayer while immigrants are not. Where the boundary between us and them is drawn is not defined, but the statement makes a clear division. Third, there is an implication that in a context of scarce resources, money is being wrongly spent on community language provisions, that this expenditure is useless or unproductive.

In this broader context of cultural fundamentalism (Stolcke 1995), there is also a kind of linguistic fundamentalism; a moral imperative attached to English monolingualism, and an implicit desire for the correlation of language and space. Even where migrants speak English fluently, multilingualism, the maintenance of a language other than English, is understood as a kind of betrayal. These different areas of concern over language provisions in the UK relate to broader ideas about language and migration. Despite successive cuts to ESOL services in the UK, English language and the necessity of migrant groups learning English has been placed at the centre of discourses on migration and British values (see for example Monaghan 2015). Modern foreign languages, on the other hand, are seen as a skill or an economic resource, which requires investment but has the potential to make good returns. There is a contradiction here in that the government is willing to invest (albeit limited) resources in teaching modern foreign languages, while at the same time discouraging multilingualism (see Monaghan 2014). The association of English with assimilation, on the one hand, and, on the other, community languages with marginalisation, assumes monolingualism to be the norm. Once it is understood that English can co-exist with other languages, other languages can in fact be promoted alongside English, and translation and interpreting services. This will ensure that both community languages and learning English are promoted rather than one at the expense of another.
2 The effect of Brexit on language provision in Manchester

There are a variety of ways that the political and funding changes described in the previous section in the context of a shift in public and political discourse could affect language provision in Manchester and minority communities more generally.

Brexit creates a risk to the supply of language provisions with the loss of EU legislation to support linguistic diversity, to interpreting and translation provisions, to English language services for speakers of other languages, and to foreign language skills. At the same time there is likely to be a shift in the demand for language services due to changes in migration patterns as well as the possibility of increased economic marginalisation of vulnerable groups such as ethnic and religious minorities, refugees and asylum seekers and the disabled. This risks being compounded by the politics anti-immigration, welfare chauvinism, and monolingualist ideologies.

2.1 Risk to language diversity: Regional languages, sign language & minority languages

Brexit will potentially affect the usage of and provision for community languages, understood broadly to include official minority languages ('indigenous' languages), other minority languages (migrant languages) and sign language. EU legislation which supports linguistic diversity is at risk, as is EU funding for minority languages. There is also a likelihood of a change in the demographic due to changing migration patterns which may affect patterns of linguistic diversity. The unpredictability of such changes could make language provision harder to plan.

The Rights of minorities are protected as part of Article 2 of the Treaty on European Union (See Europa 2017i). Where this applies to linguistic minorities it serves also to protect their rights to language and culture. In addition, EU policies and directives on language rights aim to protect linguistic diversity as well as encourage language learning (Europa 2017g). The EU’s factsheet on Language Policy states that linguistic diversity is a ‘fact of life’, and that languages ‘are an integral part of the European identity and the most direct expression of culture’ (Franke & Mennella 2017). Linguistic diversity is also incorporated in the Treaty on European Union (TEU), which draws ‘inspiration from the cultural, religious and humanist inheritance of Europe’. Additionally, linguistic rights are protected in Article 2 of the TEU which accords ‘human rights and non-discrimination’, while Article 3 states that the EU ‘shall respect its rich cultural and linguistic diversity, and shall ensure that Europe’s cultural heritage is safeguarded and enhanced’ (Eur-Lex 2012a). The Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) emphasises respect for cultural and linguistic diversity (165 [1] TFEU) and the EU charter of
Fundamental Rights (2012/C 326/02) also protects linguistic diversity. Article 21 prohibits discrimination on the basis of, among other things, language and Article 22 states explicitly that the Union shall respect linguistic diversity: On 1 December 2009, when the Treaty of Lisbon came into force, the Charter became legally binding on EU institutions and on national governments (Eur-Lex 2012b; Europa 2017b). While the white paper issued by the UK government on Brexit is in many places ambiguous, it does state that the UK will withdraw from the Charter of Fundamental Rights, and that this would not be converted into domestic law (Department for Exiting the European Union 2016; Anstead 2017). It is not clear what will replace this legislation.

In addition to legislation on language rights in general, regional and minority languages (as defined by individual states) are protected by a European Treaty, the ECRML (European Charter for Regional or Minority languages) CETS 148 (see Council of Europe 2017a; 2017b). This treaty, aimed at protecting and promoting the historical and regional languages of Europe, was adopted in 1992 under the auspices of the Council of Europe. As the charter falls under the auspices of the CoE (Council of Europe) rather than the EU will not necessarily be nullified after Brexit. The EU also has a resolution on endangered languages (Sheil 2013), and a funds to support digital language diversity (for details of this projects see DLDP 2017).

2.1.1 British Regional Languages

In 2001 the UK ratified the ECRML with seven British languages covered: Cornish, Irish, Manx, Scots, Scottish-Gaelic, Ulster Scots, and Welsh (Quartz 2017). Of the regional languages spoken in the UK none are centred on the Manchester area. However, it is likely there are pockets of speakers who have moved to Manchester. This seems to be particularly the case for Welsh and Irish, and there are Manchester specific groups for speakers of these languages. While it is possible that the UK remains party to this treaty after withdrawal, minority languages groups are concerned that the UK will reduce commitments to this and other pan-European agreements (Quartz 2017). While withdrawal from the charter would affect rights to language use, the withdrawal of EU funding would affect language provision in the form of funds for regional language education (Djevdet 2016; ELEN 2016). Regional language organisations are concerned that as the government has recently abolished funding for Cornish it seems unlikely

13 Manchester Irish Language Group. www.milg.org.uk/about.html; Manchester Welsh. www.manchesterwelsh.org.uk
14 For example the fund for Creative Europe has a cultural programme which supports minority languages. This applies to ‘indigenous’ minority languages (the regional languages discussed above), but not to other migrant or ethnic minority languages such as Urdu or Polish.
they would choose to replace funding for minority languages after Brexit (Quartz 2017; ELEN2016).

2.1.2 Sign Language
According to the Information Centre (2007) run by the NHS there were 2,190 people registered as deaf or hard of hearing in the Manchester Metropolitan area in 2007. Sign language is covered by disability legislation as well as language diversity legislation. The EU (rather than individual states) is party to the UN Convention on Rights of Persons with Disabilities (UNCRPD) meaning the UK will no longer be party to this convention following Brexit. Similarly future disabilities legislation, including the European Accessibility Act (proposed in 2015 but not yet in effect), will not be introduced in the UK (BBC News 2016a). There is also EU legislation specifically for sign language. The European Parliament adopted a resolution on sign languages and interpreters (T8-0442/2016) in 2016, stressing that deaf, deafblind and hard-of-hearing citizens must have equal access to same information and communication (Franke & Manella 2017; Hay 2016a; Europa 2017f). The resolution also calls for standardised, pan-European professional qualifications for sign language interpreters. The UK has a relatively good record for the provision of sign language, making it possible that EU provisions would be replaced with national ones. However, organisations who work to promote sign language have also expressed concern about the possible impact of Brexit (Hay 2016b). Disability support has been repeatedly cut by the UK government in recent years, and there has been a concurrent increase in anti-disability hate crimes. Of particular concern is a UN report accusing the UK of grave disability rights violations. Sign language is therefore at risk after Brexit both in terms of diversity legislation, and disability legislation.

2.1.3 Other minority languages
Overall the risks to regional languages will affect parts of the country where official regional languages are spoken more than Manchester. Any changes in regulations and support for sign language will be country wide and will therefore include Manchester. Where Manchester, as an ethnically diverse city, will be specifically affected is in the reduction of funds to support migrant groups and their languages, which should be seen in the context of possible demographic changes. According to census data the top five countries of origin for migrants in Manchester are Pakistan, Ireland, Poland, China and Nigeria (see Bullen 2015 for details of census data). In terms of languages, the largest number of migrants from non-UK EU countries

\[\text{At least one hate crime committed against a person for using sign language has been reported by media in Manchester this year (Day, 2017a, 2017b, Mills 2017, British Transport Police 2017). While it is hard to prove a direct link between government policy on disability and hate crime, several charities have supported the idea that the two are linked (Walker 2012).\]
spoke Polish, followed by French, Spanish, Greek and Portuguese. There are more migrants speaking South Asian languages than European languages, primarily Urdu, followed by Panjabi, then Bengali. Somali is the largest African language, and Chinese is the largest East Asian language (Bullen 2015). In addition, there is a diverse range of smaller groups and it is likely the extent of this diversity is not captured in census data. As well as longer term migration trajectories (particularly from Pakistan starting in the 1950s) there are recent, more temporary patterns of migration to Manchester for temporary work or study. Community languages spoken in Manchester include both non-EU (such as Urdu, Arabic and Chinese) and EU (such as Polish) languages (see Gaiser & Matras 2016 and other information on the Multilingual Manchester website).16

According to NALDIC (2012) supplementary education in community languages were suffering local authority funding cuts long before the referendum. NALDIC contest the cuts made to local community grant funding pointing to the benefits of community language education for both pupils and schools. While many community language organisations are independently funded, some also access EU funds. Partner organisations of the ESF have supported, for example, a project to teach and encourage the use of Chinese at Manchester airport (WEA, 2017). Similarly, these funds have supported organisations such as Polish centres in other parts of the country, and the potential to gain similar funds in the Manchester area will be lost if these funds are discontinued.

2.1.4 Language diversity: Changes in demand

The need for language provisions for UK regional languages is not likely to be directly affected by Brexit.17 The need for sign language provisions will not change significantly, though changes in general disability rights may mean there is increased isolation of sign language users. There is likely to be significant change in the demand for language provisions for both EU/EEA and other minority languages in the UK, relating to possible demographic changes following changes in citizenship after Brexit (see section 1), as well as to the increasing resistance to migrants and migrant languages in the UK. There is also a risk that people will alter their language use due to the attacks and negative publicity described in section 3.

16 mlm.humanities.manchester.ac.uk.
17 It is possible these will be affected by political shifts, particularly in the relationship between Westminster and Scotland and Westminster and Northern Ireland. These possibilities are beyond the scope of this report.
2.2 Risk to multicultural communication: Translation & English for non-English Speakers

For those who speak little or no English there is a risk of increased marginalisation. This relates first to the weakening of translation and interpreting provisions which enable those with limited English to access essential services. Second this relates to the provision of ESOL classes to enable people to learn English.

Where minority communities are concerned, translation and interpreting are sometimes seen as reinforcing marginalisation, in contrast to ESOL, on the basis that translation and interpreting services make it less necessary for non-English speakers to learn English (see Baynham for an analysis of this issue 2014). In reality of course these two different provisions serve different ends: translation and interpreting services convey important information (such as between patient and doctor) when those involved in the interaction do not speak English while ESOL provides for longer term language needs.

2.2.1 Translation and interpretation

Translation and interpreting services for English in combination with EU languages, community languages (to include ‘indigenous’ UK languages and other minority languages used in the UK), and sign languages will be at risk following Brexit. Under EU legislation there is particular provision for legal proceedings, intellectual property and petitioning the EU parliament.

EU directive 2010/64/EU provides the right to translators in legal proceedings and is applicable to all member states (see Ludford 2017; and Euractiv 2010). The UK already provided language services in criminal proceedings prior to this directive, and there has been no mention of them being curtailed. However, these services may be affected by changes in staffing, in particular the potential loss of interpreters and translators without UK citizenship. In addition, these services have already suffered cuts. The court interpreting system was privatised in 2012 as part of an austerity measure, which has had a negative impact on groups already affected by austerity measures (such as migrants and the disabled) and has impacted on the court system as a whole (Maniar 2017). It has also made the profession less attractive by lowering wages, and also minimising standards so that, in effect, professionalism is not rewarded and the quality of work is lower (The House of Commons 2013; Matras & Robertson 2015). As such the risk to these provisions as a result of Brexit is compounded by these policies.

The EU secures certain language rights for Treaty languages, which is to say official languages of the European Union. These include requirements for translation when petitioning the European parliament, and for intellectual property documentation.
TFEU Article 20, which pertains to the rights and duties of EU citizens states that EU citizens have:

- the right to petition the European Parliament, to apply to the European Ombudsman, and to address the institutions and advisory bodies of the Union in any of the Treaty languages and to obtain a reply in the same language.


The EU also asks for uniform protection of intellectual property throughout the Union, which includes a clause for the establishment of 'language arrangements for the European intellectual property rights' (TFEU Article 118).

The current translation services for petitioning and intellectual property will no longer be required after Brexit. However, assuming the UK will continue to cooperate and interact with EU institutions after Brexit it is likely they will need to replace or reinvent these services, and provide a range of new translation services as part of new post-Brexit political arrangements.

The shortage of interpreters and translators, particularly high quality interpreters and translators is likely to be compounded by the increased deficit in language skills described (section 2.3). According to an ITI (Institute of Translation and Interpreting) survey of its members in February 2017, translators and interpreters were concerned with the future status of the profession. The UK language industry (translation and interpreting companies) is heavily dependent on non-UK citizens and as such particular concern was raised for the prospects of this group (ITI 2017a). Equally the survey participants were concerned that UK based companies will cease to operate after Brexit. This concern over loss of trade in the language industry is echoed elsewhere by the Institute of Translation and Interpreting (2017b) and by the Association of Translation Companies (ATC) (2016). The language industry may also be affected by the loss of the ESF, described in section 1, as one of the skills co-funded by the ESF and the SFA is ‘community interpreting courses’ aimed at training those who speak English and a community language to be professional interpreters (Gov.uk 2017e). NGOs which receive EU funds for migrant support and language services (for example Migrant Help which is funded by the EU via the home office and runs its own not-for profit translation and interpreting service, Clear Voice) and ESF/SFA funded Community Interpreting courses may not have their funds renewed after Brexit.

Literary translation may also be affected. Creative Europe is an EU funding body which funds a wide range of cultural and artistic projects in Europe, one of which supports literary translation.
projects (EACEA 2017; 2017). They offer grants to publishers for the co-financing of translation, publication and promotion of works of fiction. The translation must be from, and into, eligible languages (which include certain non-EU European languages) and either the source or the target language must be officially recognised in an EU Member States or an European Free Trade Association (EFTA) country. Many of the projects covered are for the translation of lesser used languages (such as Balkan and Baltic languages) into major EU languages (English, French, German or Spanish). While there were several applicants from the UK, in 2016 none were accepted. However, many of the projects in other countries involved the translation to or from English. As such, while the UK may be excluded from this project after Brexit, it seems likely translations to and from English as one of the most widely spoken second languages and an official language of Ireland would be continued.

In general, translation and interpreting services may be directly affected by the removal of directives, and certain funds, as well as by an increase in the language skills deficit (described below), and a change in needs for provisions with regard to possible demographic changes described above. While it seems unlikely that, for example, literature will no longer be translated, the effect of these changes on migrant groups in the UK is far more worrying as they will be further affected by changes to ESOL provision.

2.2.2 Language learning for non-English speakers

English language provisions for foreigners which are already overstretched are at further risk with withdrawal from the EU. The EU funding priority which aims to provide the skills necessary to access employment means that funds go towards teaching English to non-English speakers in the UK. The ESF funding described in section 1 exists to promote the inclusion of disadvantaged groups, including minorities. In terms of language provisions this is relevant in that these funds support marginalised groups into work, and provide ESOL support. Organisations in Greater Manchester who work with ethnic and linguistic minorities, and have benefitted from the LEP’s ESF and Big Lottery funding include Manchester Chinese Centre, Wai Yin Society, Shelter, Home-Start, Migrants Supporting Migrants, and One Manchester. As ESF funding is not transferred directly it is hard to identify the exact amount that will be lost. It is still harder to estimate the economic loss entailed in reducing education and skills training (Vilanova 2016). In Manchester, adult education services co-funded by ESF and SFA that receive these funds include: ESOL for jobseekers; Everyday English; short courses, such as Computers for Speakers of Other Languages, ESOL Work Clubs and Community Interpreting courses (Manchester City Council. 2017). Provisions for learning English in the UK are supported by the EU and are therefore at risk. Furthermore, despite political rhetoric emphasising the importance of UK residents knowing English, ESOL services have been consistently cut. The risk
to ESOL, combined with the risk to translation and interpreting and increased anti-immigrant policies and discourses (see section 1) are likely to isolate vulnerable migrant groups.

2.2.3 Multicultural communication: Changes in demand

Increased socio-economic isolation may increase risks to physical and mental health problems, as well as the needs to access social services. At the same time there will be an increase in language barriers in accessing these services. Socio-economically marginalised EU/EEA migrants (for example unskilled labourers from Eastern Europe) are likely to be further marginalised, pushed into informal labour, and therefore require support to access translation and interpreting services, and English language support.

Based on census data Manchester City Council state that:

Manchester has a lower proportion of residents that speak English as their main language in the home than the average for England. More than double the national average of households has nobody speaking English at home (10.3% of Manchester households) and a larger than average proportion only has a child speaking English as a main language in the household

(Bullen 2015: 27).

In areas like Manchester, with particularly high rates of ethnic and linguistic diversity, this risk will be higher. While changes in directives, human resources and funding will impact across the UK, the impact will be felt particularly strongly in areas that have large populations of speakers of other languages, and particularly areas which have a diverse range of languages and changing, mobile populations.

2.3 Risk to language skills

The Union shall contribute to the development of quality education by encouraging cooperation between Member States and, if necessary, by supporting and supplementing their action, while fully respecting the responsibility of the Member States for the content of teaching and the organisation of education systems and their cultural and linguistic diversity.

In addition, TFEU Article 165 (2) states that:

Union action shall be aimed at: ‘developing the European dimension in education, particularly through the teaching and dissemination of the languages of the Member States’

The EU supports the idea that every citizen should master two foreign languages in addition to his or her mother tongue’ (COM [2008] 0566; see also Creative multilingualism [2016] for details on teaching foreign languages in the UK). The idea behind this is in part to encourage intercultural dialogue, but also to create a competitive multilingual, mobile workforce across Europe. The European Commission has also implemented the European indicator of language competence which aims to measure foreign language skills in each Member State (Commission Communication of 1 August 2005 - The European Indicator of Language Competence COM [2005] 356; see also Burge et al. 2013).

Concern about the language deficit in the UK has been raised at the level of national government. The APPG (All Party Parliamentary Group) on modern languages published its manifesto for languages in 2014 (British Council [2017a] ) where it describes the language skills deficit in the UK. Even before the referendum there was concern over monolingualism in the UK (Tinsley & Board 2013). Following Brexit the APPG published additional recommendations which include four essential language-specific objectives of the Brexit process (see British Council (2017b) for further details of the recommendations of the APPG, see also Burns 2016 and Kohl 2016).

The APPG on Modern Languages called on the Government to ensure Brexit negotiations protect the UK’s need for language skills. They highlight four language-specific objectives of the Brexit process:

1. Guaranteeing residency status for EU nationals already living in the UK and safeguarding future recruitment of EU citizens to address the shortage of language skills
2. Continuing full UK participation in the Erasmus+ programme (noting the examples of Norway and Switzerland)\(^\text{19}\)

3. Committing to legislate to replicate the rights enshrined in the 2010 European Directive on the Right to Interpretation and Translation in Criminal Proceedings

4. A post-Brexit plan in education (from primary school to post-graduate research, including apprenticeships), business and the civil service, with specific actions to ensure the UK produces sufficient linguists to meet its future requirements as a leader in global free trade and on the international stage

(British Council 2017b)

It is unlikely that the UK will be able to uphold these four points without conceding other areas. Points 1 and 2 would most likely mean maintaining the freedom of movement which as described in section 1 would be politically problematic. Points 3 and 4 concern internal politics rather than Brexit negotiations meaning it is possible they will be implemented. However, internal politics do not currently favour investment in translation and education. As discussed above the legislation in point 3 may be replicated, but this must be seen in the context of austerity and privatisation of legal interpreting in the UK. Point 4 is the most promising in the current political climate, but does still depend on language education being prioritised.

2.3.1 Language skills: Changes in demand

The UK will need language skills for services to deal with the changing migration patterns described above. They will also need language skills to deal with changing international relations and requirements. For example, language skills will be required to conduct and implement Brexit negotiations and future bilateral agreements with the EU and EU countries. If the UK chooses to re-orientate trade and business agreements it will also need language skills for new trade regions, for example the UK may need Chinese, Arabic or Russian languages, rather than French and German. There may also be a shift in the languages needed for security and intelligence purposes, particularly if intelligence cooperation between the UK and the EU does not continue after Brexit.

\(^{19}\) Erasmus is a European language education and exchange programme. It supports UK participants to study, work, volunteer, teach and train abroad in Europe. There is a variety of streams within the Erasmus+ programme which work on school education, higher education, Erasmus mundus joint masters degrees, vocational education and training, adult learning, youth non-formal and informal learning, European Union studies and sport. The higher education programme enables students from the UK to study in Europe. The loss of this programme could have serious impacts on linguistic and cultural education within the UK.
2.4 Risk to global outreach and research

2.4.1 Mobility, exchange and research

There is a risk to research, and subsequently a risk to global outreach in the UK. As a university city Manchester’s position would be affected by these changes. In particular there is a risk of research in Manchester losing global outreach and competitiveness.

The UK is a net contributor to research funding in the European Union, meaning there would potentially be more funds available for research if Britain were not in the EU. However, given successive cuts in education it seems unlikely that research will be prioritised. In addition it is clear that certain Europe wide collaborative programmes will no longer be available. This includes a variety of schemes such as Erasmus+, Jean Monnet funding, Creative Europe, and some strands of Horizon 2020 funding (The Royal Society 2017; Frenk et al. 2015; Europa 2017c).

This change in EU research funding may indirectly affect language skills and language based research. The largest source of EU research funding which the UK stands to lose is Horizon 2020. Horizon 2020 is the biggest EU Research and Innovation programme ever with nearly €80 billion of funding available over 7 years (2014 to 2020) (Europa 2017e). The aim of Horizon 2020 is to foster support and cooperation in research across the ERA (European Research Area). This is primarily science based funding but does have some elements which aim to research ‘societal challenges’. This (and other) EU research projects do not just use EU funds for research in the UK, but facilitate movement and dialogue among researchers and research institutes and as such encompass intercultural dialogue in a wide range of research areas. Such projects are enabled by the mobility of staff with language skills.

In addition to the general loss of trans-European research which will restrict general cross cultural and cross linguistic opportunities, the general loss of funds, staff, and programmes to support the learning of and research into foreign languages is likely to exacerbate the language skills deficit discussed in the previous section.
Recommendations

Brexit presents several risks to language provision in Manchester in the areas of linguistic diversity, multicultural communication, language skills and global outreach. Devolution in Manchester provides the opportunity to reduce these risks to community and language provisions. This can be done by replacing and improving existing language provisions, by preparing services for changing need, by seeking to address the root causes of resentment against other languages and speakers of other languages and by providing support for projects which seek investigate and address these issues in the Manchester area.

In terms of the supply of services, current programmes to support MFL, ESOL, community languages and translation and interpreting should be replicated at a national level following Brexit. Given that many of these areas were already being cut, they may require additional investment. This would provide Manchester with the necessary language skills, and targeted social support to improve the local economy in the long term.

Regarding the demand for services, language provisions should be strengthened in order to prepare for changes in minority groups following changes in legislation regarding the freedom of movement and the right to work in the UK. A potential increase in non-EU asylum seekers and migrant workers (both as a result of Brexit, and changing international politics) should be taken into account.

Given the resentment directed at speakers of other languages, the position of ethnic minorities in the UK should be given attention in relation to changing political discourses, particularly among pro-Brexit groups. While the Vote Leave campaign attracted voters from a range of different groups, those suffering poverty and exclusion appeared particularly susceptible to the politics of scapegoating of minorities. Therefore it is necessary to look at vulnerable ethnic minority groups in parallel to excluded ethnic majority groups. Funding should be made available to community organisations that seek to challenge these boundaries and contest the purported relationship between cuts in services and immigration, and as such might be able to offer a way forward if they received more support.
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